

■ **Authentication Bypass in Izanami  
Docker image 1.10.22  
CVE-2023-22495**

■ **Security advisory**  
2023-02-03

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# Vulnerabilities description

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## Izanami

*Izanami is a shared configuration, feature flipping and A/B testing service perfectly well suited for micro services environments written in scala and developed by the [MAIF OSS](#) team.*

## The issues

Synacktiv discovered a way to bypass the authentication in this application when deployed using the official *Docker* image. Because a hard coded secret is used to sign the authentication token (JWT), an attacker could compromise another instance of *Izanami* by doing the following steps :

1. The attacker installs his own *Izanami* application.
2. The attacker logs in and copies the content of the cookie named *Izanami*.
3. The attacker connects to the victim's website and creates a cookie named *Izanami* with the previous value.
4. **The attacker is successfully log-in, even if his user does not exist.**

## Affected versions

At the time this report is written, the version 1.10.22 was proven to be affected. Previous versions are likely to be vulnerable too.

## Timeline

Date	Action
2022-12-21	Advisory sent to <a href="mailto:oss@maif.fr">oss@maif.fr</a>
2023-01-13	CVE-2023-22495 assigned
2023-02-03	Public release

# Technical description and proof-of-concept

## Authentication bypass

The following hard coded secret is set in the official *Izanami Docker* image. The latest release can be downloaded with the following link:

- <https://hub.docker.com/layers/maif/izanami/1.10.22-SNAPSHOT/images/sha256-f65855fcff71999c77d9e9ac2ec2a9fa0f97ed2b81449e97cc22f5593c973db1?context=explore>




Illustration 1: `APPLICATION_SECRET` is set to a fixed value.

The `APPLICATION_SECRET` variable allows the application to sign cookies:




Illustration 2: Extract of the documentation (*izanami-documentation/src/main/paradox/settings/settings.md*).

Extract of *izanami-server/build.sbt*:

```
dockerCommands += Seq(
  Cmd("ENV", "APP_NAME izanami"),
  Cmd("ENV", "APP_VERSION 1.0.6-SNAPSHOT"),
  Cmd("ENV", "LEVEL_DB_PARENT_PATH /leveldb"),
  Cmd("ENV", "REDIS_PORT 6379"),
  Cmd("ENV", "REDIS_HOST redis"),
  Cmd("ENV", "KAFKA_HOST kafka"),
  Cmd("ENV", "KAFKA_PORT 9092"),
  Cmd("ENV", "HTTP_PORT 8080"),
  Cmd("ENV", "APPLICATION_SECRET
2nJS=TpH/qBfB=NI6:H/jt3@5B3IBhzD4OjWi=tCH50Bjy2=JCXO^jXeZUW47Gv4")
)
dockerExposedVolumes += Seq(
  "/leveldb",
  "/data"
)

dockerUsername := Some("maif")

dockerEntrypoint := Seq("/opt/docker/bin/start.sh")
```

The security experts identified a script that could fix this issue. Extract of *izanami-server/docker/start.sh*:

```
#!/bin/bash -e

APPLICATION_SECRET=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | base64)

HOST=$(awk 'END{print $1}' /etc/hosts)

exec /opt/docker/bin/izanami -Dlogger.file=./conf/docker-logger.xml -
Dcluster.akka.remote.netty.tcp.hostname="${HOST}" -Dcluster.akka.remote.netty.tcp.bind-
hostname="${HOST}" -Dplay.server.pidfile.path=/dev/null $@
```

## Recommendation

Randomize the value of the *APPLICATION\_SECRET* variable.